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LEGAL STANDING FOR ANIMALS AND ADVOCATES
Panelists:
David Cassuto, Jonathan Lovvorn, and Katherine Meyer*
Moderator:
Joyce Tischlert
For animal advocates, one of the most significant barriers to the courtroom
is standing. In order to litigate on behalfofan animal's interests in federal
court, the advocate must first establish standing by meeting three require-
ments: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury
must be causally connected to the act about which the plaintiff is com-
plaining, and (3) the court must be able to redress the injury. When it comes
to non-human animals, how does an advocate demonstrate an injury to es-
tablish standing? In this panel, experts in animal litigation discuss the con-
cept of establishing legal standing for animals and animal advocates; the
panelists' own experiences, including specific cases and creative methods
used; and the future of legal standing for animals.
Sandeep Kandhari: So that brings us to our next panel. This
panel is going to be about standing, at both the state and federal level.
Standing is one of those vital issues, one of those big barriers to actu-
ally helping and furthering this cause. Today, we will discuss why it
has been an issue, as well as possible solutions or strategies for over-
coming standing. To moderate this panel, I would like to reintroduce
Joyce Tischler, who will take it away from here.
.Tischler: Good afternoon. This panel is on legal standing for non-
human animals and their human advocates. When I was in law school,
I can remember my contracts professor summarized standing with a
surprisingly simple conclusion. "Either you have it, or you don't."
Our panelists are three people who know of what they speak.
David Cassuto, to my right, is a professor at Pace Law School, where
* © David Cassuto 2006. David Cassuto is a professor oflaw at Pace Law School. He
received his J.D. from the Ul}iversity of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law.
© Jonathan Lovvorn 2006. Jonathan Lovvorn is the Vice President and Director
of Animal Protection Litigation at The Humane Society of the United States. He re-
ceived his J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of Law in 1995.
© Katherine Meyer 2006. Katherine Meyer is a partner at the law firm Meyer,
Glitzenstein & Crystal. She received her J.D. from the Columbus School of Law, Catho-
lic University of America in 1973.
t © Joyce Tischler 2006. Joyce Tischler is a Founding Director of the Animal Legal
Defense Fund. She earned her J.D. from the University of San Diego in 1977.
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he began teaching in July 2003.1 He teaches in the areas of property,
professional responsibility, animal law, water law, and legal and envi-
ronmental theory.2 Prior to that, he was with Coblentz, Patch, Duffy &
Bass in San Francisco, where he practiced complex civillitigation.3 His
published work includes The Law of Words: Standing, Environment,
and Other Contested Terms and Bred Meat-A Look at the "Nature" of
Factory Farms, which is coming out in the Duke journal, Law & Con-
temporary Problems, in Winter 2007.4
Katherine Meyer is a founding partner of the public interest firm
of Meyer, Glitzenstein & Crystal in Washington, D.C.5 Ms. Meyer has
litigated numerous cases involving standing and animal advocates, in-
cluding the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
v. Ringling Bros. 6 She is one of the most experienced attorneys in the
United States when it comes to the issue of standing for animal
advocates.
Jonathan Lovvorn directs the Animal Protection Litigation pro-
gram at The Humane Society ofthe United States (HSUS), where he is
focused on developing novel legal theories.7 He also runs the animal
law clinic at George Washington University Law School,8 is a lecturer
on animal law at George Washington University Law School,9 and is
an adjunct professor of animal law at Lewis & Clark Law Schoo1.1o
I will ask you, Kathy [Meyer], to start off by telling us more than
my law school professor did. What is standing and how does it relate to
animal protection and animal rights cases?
Meyer: Actually, I thought what you said was good. "You either
have it, or you don't," and you know it when you see it. I will start with
one of Justice Douglas' quotes from Assn. of Data Processing Service
Organizations in 1970, when he said "generalizations about standing
1 Pace L. Sch., The Faculty: David N. Cassuto, http://www.law.pace.edu/facbios/
cassuto.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2006).
2Id.
3Id.
4 David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Con-
tested Terms, 28 Harv. Envtl. 79, 79-128 (2004); David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat-A Look
at the "Nature" ofFactory Farms, 70 L. & Contemp. Probs. _ (forthcoming 2007) (copy
on file with Animal L.).
5 Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal, About Us, http://www.meyerglitz.com/aboutus.html
(accessed Nov. 11, 2006).
6 317 F.3d 334, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
7 HSUS, Animal Protection Litigation Section, http://www.hsus.org/in_the_courts
(accessed Nov. 11, 2006); HSUS, The HSUS Launches Litigation Section, http://
www.hsus.org/press_and_publicationslpress_releasesl
the-hsus-Iaunches-litigation-section.html (Dec. 1, 2004).
8 George Washington U. L. Sch., Academics: Clinical Programs: Animal Law Liti-
gation Project, http://www.law.gwu.edu/AcademicsiClinical+Programsi
Animal+Law+Litigation+Project.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2006).
9 George Washington U. L. Sch., GW Law Profiles: Jonathan R. Lovvorn, http://
www.law.gwu.eduIFaculty/profile.aspx?id=3935(accessedNov.ll. 2006).
10 Lewis & Clark L. Sch., Summer School: Professor Jonathan Lovvorn, http://
www.lclark.edu/deptisummer/proClovvorn.html(accessedNov.ll. 2006).
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to sue are ... worthless."ll That about sums it up. It is hard to put it
all into a nice little package. Basically, in the federal context, it is a
constitutional requirement that the person who is actually bringing
the lawsuit is the proper person to be complaining about the illegal act
that is being complained about.12 It stems from those three little words
in Article III of the Constitution which give federal courts jurisdiction
over "cases or controversies."13 Believe it or not, those words, "case or
controversy," have been construed over the years by such strict con-
structionists as Justice Scalia to create a whole slew of barriers to get-
ting into court.14
There are three basic requirements for standing. The first is that
the plaintiff has to have an ."injury in fact": some kind of an injury that
is caused by the illegal act that is being complained about.15 The sec-
ond is the "causation" requirement: the injury that is being complained
about must be fairly traceable to the illegal act that is being com-
plained about. 16 The third requirement is that the court can redress
that injury in some fashion: what you are asking the court to do is
likely to give you some "redressability" of your injury.17 Those are the
three basic requirements for standing. In addition, there is the pruden-
tial requirement when you are suing under a statute that your claim
also be within the zone of interests that Congress intended the statute
to protect. 18 That is not a constitutional requirement, but one that
courts can apply at their discretion if they want to kick you out of
court, even though you have shown that you meet all of the constitu-
tional requirements.19 Basically, you have to be the proper person.
The idea is to make sure that the court is resolving an actual concrete
controversy: something that will be presented in an adversarial way by
the parties, something that is capable of judicial resolution, not some
hypothetical situation.
Tischler: David [Cassuto], can you talk about injury in fact? You
have called the requirement of injury in fact a sham. Would you ex-
plain that critique and start by telling us what injury in fact is?
Cassuto: Well, interestingly, if! could tell you what injury in fact
was, I would not be quite so harsh about it. The problem with injury in
11 Assn. Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
12 See e.g. Allen V. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (stating that respondents lacked
standing to litigate their claim based on injury of racial discrimination).
13 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14 See Lujan V. Defenders Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (stating that "'some day'
intentions ... do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require") [hereinafter Lujan Ill; Friends Earth, Inc. V. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 199 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting LA v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107, n. 8
(1983) (stating that "ongoing 'concerns' about the environment are not enough, for: 'it is
the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing i~quiry'"».
15 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180.
16Id.
17 Id. at 181.
18 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
19Id.
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fact, and the reason I think it is a sham, is because it means whatever
the judge on that particular day says it means. Essentially, in order to
be a case or controversy, the Supreme Court has opined that an ad-
verse party, the person bringing the suit, has to be injured in some way
or another.20 That is what the Court means by injury in fact, but I
wish it were that simple.
Let me just step back for a second, because the case or controversy
requirement in the Constitution is not defined. Over time, the Su-
preme Court has said plaintiffs have to be injured in order for there to
be a case or controversy, in order for the litigants to be truly adverse.21
We can say, ''Well, of course it makes sense that the litigant should be
injured. That's why she is suing." But that is not what injury in fact
means. First of all, what is "in fact"? I do not know. You might say, "I
see somebody tormenting their dog, and I find that profoundly dis-
turbing, and I lose sleep about it. I have become clinically depressed. I
cannot function. I cannot work." This is a very real scenario.
Can you sue that person? No, you cannot, because you are some-
how not within the zone of interests of that statute. Have you been
injured? Heck yeah, you have been injured. You cannot sleep. You are
losing your hair. You are tormented and clinically depressed. If some-
one says they are injured, unless they are lying, they have been in-
jured. When the court says you have to really be injured in order to
bring a suit, what is it saying? It is saying something tautological (Le.,
that you have to be injured to be injured), or it is saying something else
and not telling us what that is.
If I see a dog being tormented and I cannot sue, it is not because I
am not injured. It is because the court has decided that my injury is
not a kind it feels is judicially cognizable. So that is an entirely differ-
ent question. That is a normative question. If it IS a normative ques-
tion, that goes to the merits. It has nothing to do with whether
somebody is injured or not. That is why I think it is a sham.
Tischler: What would you replace it with?·
Cassuto: Let me restrict my answer to what I would replace it
with in the environmental or animal related context. It seems to me if
a statute has a citizen suit provision, that is to say, ifthere are private
Attorneys General capable of enforcing a particular law, that means
Congress has decreed that if the law is violated, there is injury. Con-
gress has created injury by stating that if the law is violated, someone
can sue to enforce it. To me, that ends the discussion about whether
.injury exists. There is legal injury, because the legislature has created
it. The court's prudential standing requirements and their rather
20 Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560.
21 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 290-91 (1979) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). "The archi-
tects of our constitutional form of government consciously limited the Judicial
Branch's 'right of expounding the Constitution' to actual 'cases' and 'controversies'
between genuinely adverse parties.... To demonstrate the 'personal stake' in litigation
necessary to satisfy Art. III, the party must suffer 'a distinct and palpable injury' ...."
(citations omitted).
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lengthy and obfuscatory expositions on whether or not there is injury
only serve to muddy the waters rather than to clarify. The result is
that people with perfectly viable causes of action cannot sue.
Meyer: It is pretty clear that Congress can create an injury that
would suffice for purposes of Article III standing. If I were going to
leave with one statement for this crowd, I would say that the work
really has to be done in the legislature. We have to get these statutes
passed. We have to get these private rights of action, as David [Cas-
suto] said. We have to get Congress to create legal rights and legal
injuries by law and then go one step further and designate who the
proper person is to bring those lawsuits. Some state animal cruelty
codes allow humane agents to bring those lawsuits on behalf of the
animals.22 There is no reason why Congress could not do that in the
federal arena as well. That is where the work really needs to be done in
order to expand standing law for animals. It is a matter of getting the
legislature to start creating these injuries and designating the proper
entities to bring those lawsuits.
Tischler: Is that not easier said than. done?
. Meyer: Ah, that is why we leave it to the lobbyists.
Tischler: Do you agree?
Cassuto: I do agree, but if it were up to me, and if we could go
back and retrofit some of these laws, I would like to take a look at
standing in general. As a concept, it is quite problematic. It is based on
these court created notions of what amounts to a case or controversy. I
would like us to go back-actually I have got stuff to do-I would like
the Court to go back and reexamine what it means by a case or contro-
versy, because it got off on the wrong track.
Meyer: It was a way for the conservative judges to keep people
like us out of court. That is exactly why they did it. That is why Justice
Scalia wrote the Lujan decision. You get conservative judges in the
courts creating these rules that apply, and at the same time, they are
claiming they do not legislate. These judges are devotees of judicial
restraint out of one side of their mouths, but out of the other side of
their mouths, they are taking the words "case or controversy" and cre-
ating all kinds of rules that are not found in the Constitution, precisely
to keep these kinds of lawsuits out of court.
Tischler: Kenneth Davis, in his administrative law treatise, im-
plied that standing is one of the most complex areas of the law.23 Not
because it needs to be, not that it is inherently complex, but because it
is so political, and-this goes well beyond animal law cases-the deci-
sions are woefully inconsistent. Is that basically what you are saying?
Meyer: Definitely.
22 See generally 18 Pa. Conso!. Stat. Ann. § 5511(i) (2004) (stating that "an agent of
any society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals, incorporated under
the laws of this Commonwealth, shall have standing to request any court of competent
jurisdiction to enjoin any violation of this section").
23 Kenneth Culp Davis, Handbook on Administrative Law 676 §199 (West 1951).
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Tischler: In a sense, standing decisions are a reflection ofjudges'
social values and political views.
Meyer: It is a complete barrier to the courtroom. If you do not
have standing, you do not get through the door. You may have a cause
of action and a door· may exist, but if you do not have standing, you
cannot get through it. So that is the end of the ballgame. In a lot of the
cases we handle, the first round is a motion to dismiss on standing-
that is if you are lucky. Otherwise, it is a motion for summary judg-
ment, and then you have to actually prove each of those three standing
requirements.24 For a motion to dismiss, you just have to allege those
three requirements in your complaint.25 That is inevitably the first
round of litigation in all of these cases. It takes a long time to get those
issues resolved. You may lose that first round in the district court and
then have to appeal to the court of appeals. Five years may go by
before you get down to the merits of your claim, assuming you prevail
on standing. It is a huge problem and a formidable barrier to having
your merits litigated.
Lovvorn: Since we are in the phase of offering a critical analysis
of standing, because I do think we are stuck with it and do not expect
the legislature or the courts to radically change it any time soon, it is
important to poinf out that the reason given for these standing re-
quirements-the need for a gatekeeping function-does not hold up
under scrutiny.26 The theory is that federal courts cannot be flooded
with cases by wild-eyed radicals trying to change the system, therefore
we need a strict standing requirement, et cetera. But no one seems to
stop to consider the amount of time that is spent litigating these is-
sues, both at the trial court and appellate level, versus just having an
open system. It would be interesting for someone to add up the amount
of attorney hours and judge hours spent fighting over these arbitrary
little standards.
We need to· remember how unique the federal system is in this
respect. Many states have taxpayer standing, which essentially means
that anyone who pays taxes in that state and can challenge an unlaw-
ful expenditure by a government entity and can bring suit.27 Humane
societies and humane agents are also authorized to bring litigation to
protect animals without a standing requirement in many states.28
24 Standing has three requirements: "a plaintiff must show (l) it has suffered an
'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81. For summary judg-
ment requirements, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
26 See e.g. Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1201 (lOth Cir. 1998) (discussing the
gatekeeping function of Article III standing).
27 See e.g. Citizens Preservation Buehler Park v. City of Rolla, 187 S.W.3d 359,
362-B3 (Mo. App. S. Dist. 2006); Sharnsian v. Dept. Conserv., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62, 73
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006), Ex parte Chern. Waste Mgt., 929 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Ala. 2005).
28 See generally 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 5511(i).
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For these jurisdictions, the absence of Article III standing has not
flooded the courts with a situation that cannot be handled. So I think
that we are stuck with standing at the federal level. I do not see the
legislature changing it, and I do not see the Supreme Court reversing
itself, although I agree that once Congress says, "Here is your citizen
suit provision," that should be sufficient.29 In short, there is a real
problem with the justification for the federal standing test, and if the
Supreme Court wanted to, there is nothing that would stop it from
watering the test down significantly.
Cassuto: That is entirely right. Since the courts made it up, they
can make up its replacement.
Meyer: Not with the way the federal judiciary is going..
Cassuto: On one hand, there is certainly a lot of danger to going
back and retrofitting. On the other hand, Jonathan [Lovvorn] is abso-
lutely right. Look at the number of states that have taxpayer standing
or far more relaxed standing requirements, and then look at this ca-
nard the federal judiciary has created where it is simply too great a
burden. If the doors to the courtroom were thrown open, it would be a
potentially entropic experience, and there is no way the system could
handle it. I sympathize with the fact that the judiciary is significantly
.understaffed, but there is the little matter of it being their job to hear
these cases. If there are not enough people to do the job, then the solu-
tion is hiring more people to help them. It does not mean that members
of the judiciary should not have to do their jobs.
I teach a course that compares the environmental laws of the
United States with those of Brazil. One of the things that continually
leaves my students' mouths agape is the number of cases the Brazilian
Supreme Court decides every year-something in the neighborhood of
sixty to one hundred thousand.30 Ifyou do the math, it means the Bra-
zilian Supreme Court spends just minutes per case.31 I am not exactly
sure how this works, to be honest with you. It does present an alterna-
tive, in that clearly, for them, it is more an issue of openness and ac-
cess than it is about case management. I am not saying that the
29 Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 571-72 (holding that Congress's authorization that "any per-
son may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged
to be in violation of any provision of this chapter" in section 1540(g) of the Endangered
Species Act did not relieve plaintiffs of the need to prove an independent basis for Arti-
cle III standing).
30 See Brazil Travel: Brazil - Supreme Court, http://www.v-brazil.com/governmenU
judiciary-branch/supreme-court.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2006) ("[T]he Brazilian Su-
preme Court is one of the busiest in the world. In 2004, the Court received 62,273 cases,
down from 109,965 in 2003.").
31 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, Calendario de Julgamentos, http://www.stf
.gov.br/processos/calendario/calendariojulgamento.asp (accessed Oct. 10, 2006) (This
website, the official site of Brazil's Federal Tribunal Calendar Page, is written in Portu-
guese and was translated by Micheline D'Angelis. The Brazilian Supreme Court hears
cases on sixty-eight days per year. With over sixty thousand cases in a year, the court
would have to hear a case approximately every two minutes.).
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Brazilian way is the answer, but I am saying that the American way is
not.
Tischler: Back to another basic. Kathy [Meyer], would you de-
scribe what informational standing is and how that relates to some of
the cases you have dealt with over the years?
Meyer: Informational standing is one of those creations of Con-
gress. It is an example of what I was talking about. Congress can, by
statute, create a legal right to which someone is entitled, and if the
person is denied that legal right, she has an injury in fact and Article
III standing.32 The classic example for informational injury is the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).33 Congress passed a statute that
said every citizen has a right to request information from the federal
government, and the federal government must disclose that informa-
tion unless it is exempt from disclosure under one of nine exemp-
tions.34 If you submit a FOIA request and the government says, "See
you later, we are not responding," you can go to court.35 There is no
question about standing. You have Article III standing simply by vir-
tue of the fact that you requested the information, and the request was
denied.36 The Supreme Court made that clear in the Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice case, which was actually a case under the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act.37 In the course of explaining why infor-
32 See Assn. Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc., 397 U.S. at 151--52 ("[T]he question of
standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which
restricts judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.'... The first question is whether the
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise."); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) ("[T]he
party seeking review ... must show that he has 'sufferled] legal wrong' because of the
challenged agency action, or is 'adversely affected or aggrieved' by that action 'within
the meaning of a relevant statute.'... [t]he plaintiff must establish that the injury he
complains of ... falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statu-
tory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." ) [hereinafter
Lujan I]. .
33 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
34 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(AHB) ("(A) ... each agency, upon any request for
.records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person. (B) In making any record available
to a person under this paragraph; an agency shall provide the record in any form or
format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in
that form or format. Each agency shall make reasonable efforts to maintain its records
in forms or formats that are reproducible for purposes of this section."); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1H9) (regarding types of information and matters to which FOIA disclosure
requirements do not apply).
35 See Natl. Lab. Rel. Rd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 238 (1978)
("[A]n agency's denial of a FOIA request is immediately reviewable in the dis'trict
court.").
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."); Pub. Citizen v. Dept. Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449
(1989).
37 491 U.S. at 443.
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mational injury existed u_nder that statute, the court used FOIA as an
example.38
Animal law attorneys have been trying to use informational injury
to establish injury in fact and get into court in a number of other in-
stances. There was another very important Supreme Court case a few
years ago called Federal Election Commission v. Akins.39 In that case,
some voters were complaining about the fact that a particular entity
was not deemed a "political committee" with~n the meaning of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act.40 The Federal Election Commission
(FEC) decided that this entity was not a political committee, and
therefore, it did not have to file all the reports that are required of
political committees41 or limit its campaign contributions.42 The court
found the plaintiffs had standing by virtue of the informational injury
they suffered as a result of the FEC not deeming this entity a political
committee.43 The voters-the plaintiffs in the case-were denied infor-
mation that, by statute, would have to be submitted by the entity if in
fact it were a political committee.44 That was enough for Article III
standing.
. Meyer & Gliztenstein has a case pending for HSUS, Defenders of
Wildlife, and some other groups that is really tricky.45 It involves three
species of African antelopes the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) re-
cently listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).46 If an animal is listed as an endangered species under the
ESA, it is entitled to all the protections of that statute.47 When the
FWS listed the three wild populations of the antelope species as en-
dangered, it simultaneously issued a special rule exempting any cap-
tive-bred animals of those species that are born and bred in the United
States.48 The reason it issued this special rule was to exempt the
38 [d. The Court noted: "[Als when an agency denies requests for information under
the Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA
Committee's activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct in-
jury to provide standing to sue. Our decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information
Act have never ~uggested that those requesting information under it need show more
than that they sought and were denied specific agency records."
39 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
40 [d. at 13., Fedenil Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000).
41 Akins, 524 U.S. at 13.
42 [d. at 14.
43 [d. at 20-21.
44 [d.
45 Pl.'s Compi. at 1-2, Cary v. Hall, No. 05 CV 04363 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 26, 2005).
46 [d. at 3.
47 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, -16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(l) (2006) ("It is further
declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their au-
thorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.").
48 HSUS, Wildlife Protection Coalition Files Suit to Protect Endangered African
Antelope from "Canned" Hunts, http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/
pressJeleases/wildlife_protection_coalition_Files_SuiCTo_Protect_Endangered
_African_Antelope_From_Canned_Hunts.html (Oct. 26, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 5117 (Feb.
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antelopes that are used on canned hunting ranches, basically in Texas,
from all the requirements of the ESA. It was basically a gift to the
Texas canned hunting operations, which pull in a lot of money and
draw people from around the world.
Canned hunting operations are enclosed ranches;49 people visit
because they want to acquire the head of one of these exotic species as
a "trophy." These are beautiful antelope species. They have beautiful
horns and are just gorgeous. People pay thousands of dollars for the
privilege of riding around in a truck, shooting one of these animals,
and then taking it home as a "trophy" and putting it on their wall.50
This is the first time in the history of the FWS' implementation of the
ESA that it has ever crafted an exemption like this for an otherwise
endangered species,51 so HSUS, Defenders of Wildlife, and other orga-
nizations wanted to bring a lawsuit. It was very difficult to establish
that anyone had Article III standing. We had some theories, and we
had a plaintiff, for example, who studies these antelope species in the
wild in Africa. We alleged that this whole scheme is going to increase
poaching and the illegal black market in the wild species, and that this
will injure our plaintiff for purposes of Article III standing.52
We also made an informational injury argument. Normally, the
only way to get an exemption from the otherwise strict requirements of
the ESA is by going through the permitting process under Section 10 of
the statute.53 Section 10 states that anyone who wants an exemption
from the ESA has to apply for the ex"emption and make certain show-
ings.54 All ofthat information has to be made available by the FWS to
the public at every phase of the proceeding, and the public is entitled
to comment on the information.55 If the FWS grants the exemption, it
has to issue certain findings; these are also published in the Federal
Register.56
Our argument-as in the FOIA context and the Akins case-is
that our clients, HSUS and Defenders of Wildlife, who regularly follow
these kinds of regulatory actions, regularly comment on them, and dis-
seminate that kind of information to their members, are being de-
prived of the information that they normally would obtain pursuant to
1, 2005) (proposed regulation providing for the hunting of captive-bred populations of
the' scimitar-horned oryx, addax, and dama gazelle in the United States).
49 HSUS, Facts about Canned Hunts, http://www.hsus.org/wildlife/
stop_canned_hunts/facts_about_canned_hunts.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2006).
50 HSUS, Sample Prices for Canned Hunts, http://www.hsus.org/wildlife/
stop_canned_hunts/sample_prices3or_canned_hunts.html (accessed Nov. 11, 2006).
51 HSUS, Trophy Hunting Group Asks Federal Court to Endorse "Canned" Hunting
of Endangered Animals Trapped Behind Fences, http://www.hsus.org/ .
press_and_publications/pressJeleases/trophy_hunting~oup_asks.html (Dec. 29,
2005).
52 PI.'s CompI. at 19-20, Cary, No. 05 CV 04363.
53 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
54 Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(A)-(B).
55 Id. at § 1539(c).
56 Id. at § 1539(d).
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the statute. Instead of going through the case-by-case permitting pro-
cess required by the statute, the FWS has created this broad exemp-
tion.57 That is an example of a creative way of trying to use
informational injury. The case is pending right now on a motion to dis-
miss on standing grounds in the Northern District of California. We
will see what happens.58
Lovvorn: I do not want to make David [Cassuto]'s argument for
him, but I find the informational injury issue to be fascinating. Courts
are very hostile to this approach, because it represents a potential shift
in the separation of powers. If informational standing is given its
broadest interpretation, it means things really shift to Congress to de-
termine who is going to be able to get into court under Article III,
rather than the court deciding itself. In some cases, the courts have
been somewhat hostile to the information injuryapproach.59 However,
as Kathy [Meyer] points out, under the FOIA,60 courts have said that if
you are denied information to which Congress says you have a right,
informational injury may exist.61 Regarding the situation with Section
10 in the ESA, obviously, ifyou have a right to the permit and informa-
tion but are denied access, that should constitute an informational in-
jury, and that is the basis for the endangered species canned hunting
suit HSUS has filed, and which Kathy [Meyer] discussed earlier.62 The
Akins case and the political committee is probably the biggest stretch
of this theory.63 And remember, just because Congress says you have a
right to the administrative record and to challenge an agency decision
in court under the Administrative Procedure Act,64 that does not mean
you have an informational injury.
But to return to the idea of Congress changing the laws to fix
standing, every time I talk to our lobbying staff about trying to do
something to change th~se statutes at the federal level, they laugh me .
out of the room. They say, ''We can't even ban cock fighting at the na-
tional level."65 Since the judiciary is getting more and more hostile to
57 [d. at § 1539 (providing for case-by-case permitting); see generally 70 Fed. Reg.
52310 (Sept. 2, 2005) (exceptions granted from the Endangered Species Act for certain
captive populations of specific antelope species).
58 On September 30, 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California
upheld the plaintiffs' informational injury theory for purposes of standing. Cary v. Hall,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78573 at *28, 40 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2006).
59 ALDF v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496,501--02 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting Article III standing
based on informational injury under the AWA).
60 5 U.S.C. § 552.
61 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449.
62 Supra nn. 45-48
63 Akins, 524 U.S. at 20-21.
64 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
65 See Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act Sen. 382, 109th Congo (May 2,
2005); H.R. 817, 109th Congo (Feb. 15, 2005); see also Daniel W. Reilly, Face-off over
Green's bill: Sensenbrenner blamed for holdup, Milw. J. & Sent. (Sept. 27, 2006) (avail-
able at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=503696) (describing how a bill to
toughen penalties for cockfighting and dogfighting sponsored by Rep. Mark Green is
being held up in the House Judiciary Committee by Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner).
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our positions in general, we also probably should not be looking there
for a major expansion. What is going to carry the day, if anything, is
looking at creative theories on competitive injury or trying to expand
informational injury, among other things. That is where the activity
has to be, at least for the short term, because we are unlikely to find
relief in these other venues.
The reality of high fences and closed doors is also problematic,
such as the canned hunting facilities that nobody sees, because nobody
is there; animal research labs-no access; factory farms-no access.
Those challenges are very difficult for purposes of Article III, because
animal advocates do not see it, and therefore cannot claim a tradi-
tional Article III injury. The only way we are going to get there is by
using creative theories or by reaching out to people who do see it. For
example, we have a case right now on the federal Humane Slaughter
Act (HMSA).66 We have added, as plaintiffs, workers in poultry facili-
ties who have come forward, believe it or not, risking their jobs and
potential physical violence, to try to do something about the fact that
the HMSA has not been applied to poultry.67 As animal protection or-
ganizations, our ability to overcome these hurdles is going to depend
on our ability to reach out beyond our community to other social move-
ments and organizations in order to find people who can provide the
Article III standing we need.
Meyer: Jonathan [Lovvorn] is saying, "If you cannot see it, you
cannot be injured by what is happening." That is the dilemma to which
he is referring. Under the law, you cannot be injured if you cannot
show that you had some sensory impact as a result of what you saw.68
Just knowing about it or reading about it in the newspaper and know-
ing it is happening is not enough for Article 111.69
Tischler: What about shifting the focus to state courts? Are the
standing requirements less onerous there?
Lovvorn: Certainly, that is something people are looking into.
The state court system, at least in some states, does not have the same
Article III standards as the federal system. Although those courts see
us coming and want to raise the standing bar as high as they can. We
have a taxpayer standing case in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
right now challenging canned hunting.70 We also have a taxpayer
66 See PI.'s CompI. at 3, Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05 4764 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005)
(challenging the exclusion of poultry from the definition of "livestock") (available at
http://www.hsus.org/web-filesIPDFIHMSA30mplaint.pdD.
67 Compare 70 Fed. Reg. 56624, 56624-25 (Sept. 28, 2005) (informing slaughter-
houses and the public that the HMSA does not require "humane methods" for "handling
and slaughter of poultry") with the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902
(directing that all "cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock" be
"rendered insensible to pain" before being processed for slaughter).
68 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
69 [d. at 734-35.
70 HSUS, Current Docket: The Fund for Animals v. Pennsylvania Game Commission,
http://www.hsus.org/in_the30urts/docket/tioga_canned_hunting.html (accessed Nov.
11,2006).
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standing case in a California superior court challenging a state sub-
sidy for the confinement of hens in battery cages.71 There may be a lot
of action in the state court system in the future, but then again, there
are limitations. Federal court is more difficult to get into, but presuma-
bly, once you get there, things are better-although I put a big empha-
sis on presumably.
Meyer: That is how we were able to end the Hegins Pigeon
Shoot-through a state court action.72 Pennsylvania's animal cruelty
code, unlike most animal cruelty codes, actually has a civil action pro-
vision that can be invoked by a humane agent, such as a humane soci-
ety.73 On behalf of The Fund for Animals and the Pennsylvania
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, we were able to put
together that lawsuit and bring a case to enjoin future pigeon shoots.74
But those are rare situations. I do not even know how many state laws
have those kinds of provisions; not very many.
Lovvorn: That is what I mean about the need to branch out.
There is a tremendous residual amount of law enforcement authority
residing with humane agents and humane societies at the state level
that really needs to be activated, because the draconian federal stand-
ing requirements do not exist.75 Certainly at the federal level, there is
nothing that would necessarily-if you want to talk about really radi-
cal changes-prevent the appointment of national humane societies to
enforce animal protection laws the way they do at the state level. It
will not happen for a long time, but it should.
Meyer: The Animal Welfare Act (AWA)-that is where we need a
private right of action. We need designated people to bring those cases;
otherwise, that statute is not worth the piece of paper it is written on,
unfortunately.
Tischler: In the Glickman case, Kathy [Meyer], the court held
that standing was based on an injury to an aesthetic interest.76 What
about Ringling Bros. ? .
Meyer: The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals v. Ringling Bros. case is actually pending right now in federal
court.77 We are representing another coalition of groups-the Ameri-
can Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Wel-
fare Institute, The Fund for Animals, the Animal Protection Institute,
71 HSUS, The HSUS et al. v. California State Board ofEqualization (battery cage tax
breaks) , http://www.hsus.org/in_the_courts/docket/ca_battery_cages.html (accessed
Nov. 11, 2006).
72 Hulsizer v. Lab. Day Comm., Inc., 734 A.2d 848, 848 (Pa. 1999).
73 18 Pa. Conso!. Stat. Ann. § 551l(i).
74 Hulsizer, 734 A.2d at 848.
75 More than a dozen states provide a method for humane societies, humane agents,
or citizen eyewitnesses to initiate enforcement actions for violations of the cruelty code
without any type of injury in fact requirement. See Jennifer H. Rackstraw, Reaching for
Justice: An Analysis of Self-Help Prosecution for Animal Crimes, 9 Animal L. 243
(2003).
76 ALDF v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
77 317 F.3d 334, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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and a former circus employee, Tom Rider.78 That case was also tricky,
because in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, the D.C. Circuit
Court held that an individual who went to the zoo repeatedly to see
particular animals was injured aesthetically by seeing primates in sol-
itary confinemen~without any enrichment.79 That plaintiffhad stand-
ing to challenge the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
for its failure to carry out the congressional mandate in the 1985 AWA
amendments, requiring that the USDA promulgate standards for the
psychological well being of primates.80 Another requirement of "injury
in fact" is that it cannot be a past injury.81 It has to be either a contin-
uing injury or a threatened injury-an injury that is on the horizon,
about to happen.82
Past injuries will not suffice. In the Glickman case, we were able
to establish standing because Mark Jurnove, who had gone to the zoo
repeatedly to see these particular animals, alleged in his affidavit that
he kept going back and was going to continue to go back, because he
had bonded with these particular primates.83 He could not abandon
them, he felt compelled to go back and continue to fight for them and
see them, and therefore he had continuing aesthetic injuries.84
In the Ringling Bros. case, our main" argument for Article III
standing was that Tom Rider had been a barn man for the elephants
and had seen the mistreatment of the Asian elephants.85 This case
challenges the treatment of Asian elephants under the ESA, because
Asian elephants are an endangered species.86 Rider had left the circus,
because he could not bear to see the mistreatment of the Asian ele-
phants anymore.87 The trick for Rider was, how do you show a continu-
ing injury or a future injury, when the circus is going to argue that the
plaintiff only has past iJ\juries, and therefore, those injuries are not
"cognizable for Article III purposes?
Luckily for us, right before we brought that case, the Laidlaw de-
cision was issued by the Supreme Court.88 Laidlaw held that individu-
als who used to canoe in a river forty years ago-and would like to
canoe in the river again, but who feared that the river was polluted,
78 [d. at 335.
79 Glickman, 154 F.3d at 438.
80 [d. at 428.
81 See Steel Co. u. Citizens Better Enu., 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (quoting O'Shea u.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96) ("Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show
a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.").
82 See Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that to qualify as a constitutionally suffi-
cient injury in fact, the asserted injury must be "concrete and particularized," as well as
"actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'").
83 Glickman, 154 F.3d at 43l.
84 [d. at 430.
85 Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 336.
86 [d. at 335.
87 [d.
88 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 167.
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and therefore had to avoid using the river that they otherwise would
have liked to use-had Article III standing89-their apprehension
about using the river in a recreational way was valid. Even though the
district court had found that the river was not in fact polluted in that
case, the majority, led by Ruth Ginsberg, held that this did not mat-
ter.90 The plaintiffs had Article III standing because they had to make
the choice to avoid using the river that they otherwise would have
liked to use.91
When that decisi~n was issued, we saw an opening for Rider to
have standing. What we alleged in that case, and will have no problem
proving, is that Rider fell in love with the Asian elephants with whom
he worked. He really did bond with them. He knows them all by name
and spent a lot of time with them. He could not bear seeing them mis- .
treated. He left the circus, because he could not take it anymore. He
would like to go back and visit them and see them again, but he is in
this position of having to make the choice to avoid going back to see
them, because that is the only way he can avoid subjecting himself to
more aesthetic injury. These are the kinds of hoops through which we
must jump; this is what you have to do to come up with these standing
theories.
So we used Glickman plus Laidlaw, a 2000 Supreme Court deci-
sion under the Clean Water Act,92 and came up with the novel argu-
ment that Rider was suffering Article III injury because he had to
avoid going back to see his "girls," as he calls them, whom he loved so
much.93 We lost on this theory on a motion to dismiss in the district
court, on the grounds that Rider would never suffer that kind of injury
again, because he is not allowed to come back and see the elephants.94
We said, ''Well, all he has to do is buy a ticket to the circus," and we
prevailed on appea1.95 We had to go up to the D.C. Circuit to get the
trial court reversed.96 Now we are back down on the merits of that
case. We lost three years on the standing issue, but that is how we
established standing.
Cassuto: There are a couple of really interesting threads to this
whole actual or imminent injury thing. According to the courts, if you
do not know you are injured, then how can you be injured? There is a
certain rhetorical attractiveness to that idea. But on the other hand, if
you extrapolate: if you put a child in a dark room and never let light
89 [d. at 183-84.
90 [d. at 183-85.
91 [d. at 181-82.
92 Glickman, 154 F.3d at 431 (plaintiff claimed injury from seeing animals at a zoo
treated inhumanely); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181 (actual injury to the plaintiff is enough
to establish standing for Art. III); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (2000) (granting authorization
for citizen suits).
93 Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 335.
94 [d. at 336.
95 [d.
96 [d. at 339.
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into the room, the child will never know anything about sunlight or
what it is like to live outside of the dark. Will that child be injured?
The child will never know that there is a light-filled world out there,
but will that child be injured? I would argue that, of course, that child
will be injured. This idea that if you do not know exactly what is hap-
.pening-if you are not privy to it, if you are not allowed to see it-that
somehow protects you from injury, is specious. It gets back to the idea
of actual or imminent injury, which this is. Sorry to ride this particular
hobby horse, but since it is made of wood, I guess that is okay.
If we are talking about actual injury, we get back to "What is an
injury?" Is it actual? Yes, it is actual. Then you get to imminent. This
gets into an area of the law that, again, leads to a lot of problems: not
just in animal law, not just in standing, but elsewhere. What is an
imminent injury? Exactly how soon does something have to occur
before it is imminent? The Supreme Court has said you have to have a
plane ticket to go and see the problem before it is imminent.97 How did
it come up with that? How do judges get away with making this stuff
up?
Extrapolate this to a criminal law context. Assume we have a bat-
tered spouse who has been continually beaten over a period of years by
her abusive, psychotic husband. He is drunk, and he says to her right
before he passes out, "When I wake up, I'm going to kill you." Then he
goes to sleep. He is not going to kill her any time soon. He may be
passed out for hours. Can she act in self-defense right then? Can she
take some kind of preemptive action? Or does she have to wait until he
wakes up and goes and gets himself the weapon which he is going to
use to kill her? Is the injury imminent right before he passes out, or
during that time he is passed out? I suggest it is. The court apparently
would disagree with me, because she has not yet seen him come to-
ward her with the loaded weapon. What sense does this make in a
practical context? What sense does it make in a human to human in-
teractive context? And what sense does it make in a civil litigation con-
text when what we are trying to do is protect? Ifwe are dealing with an
animal protection statute and trying to protect animals, why must we
have these silly arguments about imminence?
Tischler: I have one problem with that analogy: a battered
woman has a third option-to get out, to leave-and the animals do
not have this option.
Cassuto: Yes, I think that is a valid point. But again, what if we
are talking about somebody who, for whatever reason-because ofpsy-
chological or physical injury; because there is a child in the house; or
because there is a pet in the house, which is a recurring theme with
respect to battered spouses-cannot leave? What are the alternatives?
Lovvorn: Part of what is lurking here that we have not really hit
head on is the double standard that exists with regard to animal pro-
tection versus environmental, commercial, or any other type of litiga-
97 Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tion in which the plaintiff may have to deal with Article III. We have
known for years that the bar is set higher for animal protection advo-
cates. Injury in fact, causation, and redressability are going to be scru-
tinized a lot more. The problem is that the courts do not really think
the injury about which we are talking is a real injury. It is just an
emotional subjective preference. It is not the same as somebody losing
money. It is not the same as someone seeing a mountaintop sheared off
where they have hiked for twenty years, although obviously it is.
This is interesting, because we finally, after all these years of
knowing this, got a ruling from the D.C: Circuit a few years ago essen-
tially holding that it is okay to just assume that people who are finan-
cially affected have standing,98 For those people, the courts do not
have to look at the details, but for everyone else, they do. In my opin-
ion, the court finally just came out and said it was going to do this on a
double standard.
AE advocates, it is our role to try to figure out these secret rules.
We talk about standing being a big game; it certainly is. We have to
figure out how to make whatever injuries we are talking about, be they
informational, aesthetic, emotional, or otherwise, sound plausible to a
judge trained in looking at commercial litigation. The question of
standing comes down to this: Does the injury you are articulating
make sense in the context of an auto accident or commercial dispute?
One of the reasons why courts will not accept, for Article III purposes,
merely knowing or hearing about animals being treated inhumanely
without being there and witnessing it is because it sounds a whole lot
like negligent infliction of emotional distress.99 Thus, a lot of the stan-
dards that you see applied in Article III are just a rough game of, "Does
whatever you are putting forward sound similar enough to the com-
mon law causes of action that I was taught in law school?" All the other
factors for Article III tend to fall into place after that. You can look at
the injury someone is arguing and determine whether or not it is going
to pass the test, based on how much it sounds like a common law the-
ory. I agree that the Article III standing test is largely a sham in most
cases, but it also shows that there is a method by which you can play
and win this particular game. And cases like Laidlaw certainly help in
that regard. lOO
Tischler: There is dicta that the purpose of standing is to ensure
that plaintiffs will pursue the litigation to its conclusion. A presump-
tion exists that ifthe plaintiffs have a financial interest, they are likely
98 Fund for Animals, Inc., u. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
99 See e.g. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965) (for the definition of negligent
infliction of emotional distress); see also Auerbach u. Vnescheconombank, 280 F. Supp.
2d 945, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing how California courts do not recognize the tort).
100 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (holding that environmental plaintiffs have injury in
fact based on their concerns that the river they use might be polluted).
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to follow through, because their own financial well being is at stake. 101
However, if animal advocates allege that they are harmed because ani-
mal!'i owned by some third party are suffering, the presumption is that
these advocates will somehow not follow through. As we all know,
animal advocacy organizations, whose mission and goals are to protect
animals, are highly likely to follow through on litigation. What can
these plaintiffs do to convince judges that they will go the distance?
Lovvorn: You hear it a lot, this idea that public interest advo-
cates will not follow through in the same way as people who are con-
cerned about financial loss. But go down to the superior court in
whatever town you live one morning when it is hearing law in motion,
and just listen to what is going on there. A good portion of it involves
people who have not pursued their cause of action for more than two
years after filing it. The judge is often on the bench saying, "Is anyone
here today for this case? Is anyone going to show up and actually argue
it? Okay, we're going to finally dismiss it." The idea that private liti-
gants are somehow going to more fully pursue their rights than public
interest organizations or advocates is totally false. I have never heard
of a public interest group not bothering to send counsel to court when
it has a hearing. If you watch the civil docket, you will see major corpo-
rations that do not bother to send a lawyer. That whole idea that pub-
lic interest advocates will not follow through is something that we
really need to attack.
Cassuto: There is a certain moral schizophrenia, and what we
have here is a sort of legal schizophrenia. One of the reasons that me-
diation has come to the forefront as a method of alternative dispute
resolution is because people have finally started to recognize as a socio-
logical phenomenon what we, as lawyers, see all the time: the fact that
people say, "I don't care about the money. I just want the bastard to
apologize." That is so often true. Mediation allows a dispassionate, dis-
interested professional to say, ''You know, I think we can make this go
away ifyou will just acknowledge that you did something wrong and/or
stop doing this thing that's wrong. It is not about the money. You can
get away without a very onerous civil judgment if you will just discuss
the root causes for the plaintiffs upset." The idea that money has to be
involved is a smokescreen. More often, litigation involves things about
which people care deeply. Most people do not care deeply about money.
They want it; they like it; they would like more of it, but it is not the
thing that drives them on a visceral level.
Tischler: In 1972, Professor Christopher Stone published an es-
say titled: Should Trees Have Standing?102 I recall the first time I
101 For a list of federal circuit cases that have recognized economic interests in stand-
ing, see General Principles Governing Standing to Maintain Action, 61 A.L.R. Fed. 87,
99-101 (1983).
102 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Nat-
ural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 450--501 (1972).
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read that essay; it was wonderful and inspiring. I called it "legal po-
etry." But, has it influenced either the literature or the courts?
Lovvorn: The interesting thing about Stone's piece is that it was
very influential in the environmental movement and was actually
cited in Justice Douglas' famous dissent in the Sierra Club case.l°3
But that was thirty years ago when Sierra Club attorneys managed to
get at least one Supreme Court Justice to say, more or less, "Why don't
we just forget about all this and acknowledge that trees and rocks and
beautiful places should have Article III standing in their own right."104
As a practical matter, after thirty years of significant work on environ-
mental protection, the fact is that this theory has really gone nowhere
in terms of working for the environmentalists. The lesson is that this
kind of change in the test for access to federal courts is probably some-
what impractical at this phase. It is a wonderful piece. For anyone who
loses a standing case, probably one ofthe most therapeutic things to do
is go and read Justice Douglas's dissent afterwards.
Maybe Stone's theory will be the future of animal law, but in
terms of environmental protection, it has not been the case. Maybe it
influenced the Laidlaw decision. Maybe judges who decide they are
not going to apply these Article III. standards too strictly have Christo-
pher Stone in their back pocket.
Tischler: Let us take some questions from the audience.
Question: Kim Stallwood, Animals & Society Institute. Is there
not a cliche that the definition of insanity is someone who keeps re-
peating something and expecting a different outcome? Why am I think-
ing of that when I hear what you are saying about standing? If it is
such an impediment, why have we, as the animal movement, not actu-
ally tried to do something about it? It seems to me, how can we expect
to get existing laws enforced for animals, how can we get better laws
passed for animals, if we cannot sue on their behalf?
Meyer: I totally agree with you. As I said in the beginning, it is a
legislative problem. A lot of this can be cured by legislative fixes. The
problem is that the current legislature is apparently packed with anti-
animal representatives. Thinking about Douglas's dissent in Sierra
Club u. Morton, one of the things he said, which I think is very telling,
was that there should be legitimate spokespersons for the trees, otters,
and biodiversity, and that Congress can, in theory, designate those le-
gitimate spokespeople. 105
Congress can say that it is against the law to pollute the environ-
ment, it is against the law to torture an animal, and it is against the
law to neglect an animal. Congress can decide that certain individuals
may go to court and assert the interests of those injured entities, in the
same way as Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
103 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104 [d. at 742-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 405 U.S. at 745.
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designation of a next friend for incapacitated individuals. 106 That is a
congressional designation of a particular person to represent the inter-
ests of the injured. The same thing can happen here. We need some
kind of a concerted plan, and we can start one statute at a time. My
priority is the AWA. We need to get that statute amended, figure out a
way to do it so that when the statute is violated, people can go in and
sue. It may not happen with this Congress or the next Congress, but
we have to start working to ensure that it happens eventually. Other-
wise, we are counting on the USDA to enforce that statute, which it
rarely does. 107 People are very limited in what we can do, in terms of
bringing lawsuits. We can sue the governing. agency if it issues a deci-
sion we do not like, but we cannot sue the actual violators. lOB That is
the problem. I totally agree with you, it is something we need to focus
on and start strategizing about. I know people are already doing so. I
am not suggesting this is a novel idea. People have been grappling
with this for years.
Cassuto: Let me just add one caveat, even though I endorse what
both of you have been saying. There is something that nags at me
when I think about why we are not enacting laws about this stuff. Part
of it comes back to, if you will, the chicken or the egg phenomenon with
respect to whether laws codify norms, or vice versa. If we are making
. laws in order to create norms, then what we are doing is sort of antici-
pating that people will agree with us, rather than assuming that these
laws will arise organically from a sense of outrage about a status quo.
My favorite example: you go to a restaurant-every restaurant
you have ever been in-you go to the bathroom, and there is a sign in
the bathroom that says, "Employees must wash their hands with
warm water and soap before returning to work." Well, I do not know
about you, but I want to live in a world where people already know
that, where you do not have to legislate that kind of behavior. It is just
one of those things that you do, because you know it is right; it is nor-
mative phenomenon before it is codified into law.
Here, we have the mistreatment of animals, which is, as yet, not
recognized as normatively outrageous. I fear that enacting a law about
it prior to the creation of that outrage will be counterproductive. That
is my fear.
Question: I am going to play the devil's advocate, having tried
these civil cases and tried to prosecute cases in rural areas. We are
talking a lot about human standing. There is always a way to find
human standing, the public health issue being one great way. But we
are not talking about what I see as the longer-term problem of stand-
ing for animals. What I think it is-and I am wondering how you feel
106 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
107 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2132,2133,2142 (2006) (stating that Secretary of
Agriculture is authorized to promulgate humane standards under the Act).
108 [d. at § 2146; 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (compare the enforcement provisions of the
Animal Welfare Act, which does not allow for citizen suit, with the Endangered Species
Act, which does contain a citizen suit provision).
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about this-is confusion over the definition of property. What are we
doing as a large movement to be a force and say, "Look, we need to
reclassify this as guardianship, not property." I do not see a big change
happening until we get the standard of chattel and property changed
over to guardianship. Someone like a guardian ad litem could say,
"Look, this animal cannot speak English, but I'm going to speak for it."
What can we offer to the farming community, to the meat packing
industry, to the animal breeders; the dog breeders who make a liveli-
hood out of this, to say, ''Yeah, we know you make a livelihood out of
this, and we're going to take your property away, because we don't like
how it looks." We have art galleries with chicken heads, and it looks
distasteful to us. But is it not true that the fundamental problem we
are having as a movement is that we want to take away people's prop-
erty, and that is how it is seen? Until we do that, we can find individ-
ual human standing in every place in the world, but the animals are
never going'to have it the way we are going about it. I was just wonder-
ing if anybody had thoughts on this. Am I totally out of touch with
things? I feel frustrated going through individual case to individual
case and having judges make their decisions before I even walk in and
say hello. As long as there are farmers and people with livelihoods and
a lot of money saying, "this is my property, damn it," I don't see a very
large change taking place. What are we doing for that larger view of
what animals are, as property versus our friends over whom we have
stewardship?
Meyer: Everything everybody is doing is helpful to that cause.
This is a movement. We would all like it to go faster. There is a lot to
do, but Steve Wise's books, and the works of other people who are writ-
ing about these issues, are very important.109
All of the cases that Jonathan [Lovvorn] is handling, cases we are
handling for groups, all of it adds up to what David [Cassuto] was say-
ing: we need to make these actions politically incorrect, we have to
generate that public outrage. We have to make it politically incorrect
to do these things, such as considering animals as property. Until we
change the way people think, we are not going to reach that point. You
have got to admit-I know it is slow going and people are frustrated-
but there has been a lot of change. Joyce [Tischler] has been at the
forefront of it. There has been tremendous change. It is becoming grad-
ually more and more politically i.ncorrect to do some of these things.
With these farming issues-it is very important what HSUS is do-
ing,110 as are other groups-we are talking about billions of animals.
109 See e.g. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Per-
seus Bks. 2000) (discussing fundamental legal rights for animals); Animal Rights: Cur-
rent Debates and New Directions (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., Oxford
U. Press 2004) (exploring the legal and political issues of animal rights).
110 HSUS, Litigation for Farm Animals, http://www.hsus.org/farm/camp/lit-leg/
litigation.html (accessed Nov. 3, 2006); see also HSUS, News: USDA Reverses Decades-
Old Policy on Farm Animal Transport, http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/ournews/
usda_reverses_28_hour_policy.html (Sept. 28, 2006) (announcing the USDA decision
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You have to do it incrementally. This is not going to divulge any great
secret, but a lot of us here in this room are looking for the right sets of
facts to bring those first guardian ad litem cases. That is where we are
going. The way you get there is by bringing other cases first. It is like
Brown v. Board of Education in the civil rights context,111 which was
not the first case brought to establish that principle; there were other
incremental cases leading up to Brown.112 Everything that everybody
is doing-~ritingabout it, talking about it, having conferences, bring-
ing cases-all of that adds collectively to the movement. I agree that it
is frustrating and there is a lot more to do, but we are going in the
right direction.
Cassuto: I would add that the point you raise about the property
sta.tus of animals is, of course, very disturbing and very urgent. It is
part of a larger issue within the notion of property status and private
property in general that it is okay to allow a taking of private property
to give to another private entity in order for there to be urban re-
newal.113 Now, whether or not one agrees with that concept, whether
or not one thinks that is a good idea, the fact is that, in the Kelo deci-
sion, the Supreme Court stated something that has been the case for
over one hundred years.l I4 It did not make any new law. Pretty much
no urban redevelopment could take place without that law. But what
happened? Congress, virtually every state legislature, and property
rights advocates all over this nation became hysterical, and now there
is a backlash against this idea of the state exercising its right of emi~
nent domain. 115
When we talk about whether or not we have to change the prop-
erty status of animals-yes, of course, we have to change the property
status of animals. But the whole notion of private property is so prob-
lematic and so visceral that if Congress passed a law tomorrow saying
animals are not property, the only thing that would happen is you
would have the kind of backlash that would set this movement back
that the Twenty-Eight Hour Law covers the long-distance transportation of animals on
trucks).
111 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
112 See Mo. ex reI. Gaines v. Can., 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (stating the" basic consid-
eration is not as to what sort of opportunities other States provide ... but as to what
opportunities Missouri itselffumishes to white students and denies to negroes"); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,636 (1950) (holding that a university must admit a black stu-
dent); McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (holding that the univer-
sity could not segregate students once they had been admitted).
113 Kelo v. City New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5011 (June 23,
2005).
114 Id.
115 See generally Richard Stradling, David Bracken & Janell Ross, Property Ruling
Fuels Concern, Raleigh NC News & Observer Bl (Oct. 24, 2005) (commenting that the
"recent U.S. Supreme Court decision ... has some ... residents worried the same thing
could happen to them"); Kevin Collison & Warren Erdman, Eminent Domain and TIF
Reforms Needed Some Say, Others Advise Caution, Kan. City Star D16 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(commenting that "opponents of eminent domain ... have begun lobbying lawmakers to
introduce bills that would ban the use of condemnation for economic development").
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probably 150 years. We have to be cognizant of that backlash as we
agitate for the kind of important changes you are noting.
Lovvorn: Certainly, the situation with regard to the property sta-
tus of animals, the courts, Article III, and our ability to get what we
want is very frustrating. The problem is, right now, no member of Con-
gress would even introduce a resolution saying that animals are not
property. No member of Congress would suggest-well, maybe one or
two somewhere might-a citizen suit provision for the AWA. It is not
viable. The key is to look at that political climate and remember that
the courts are people, and they are political. They are not the objective
institutions people think they are. If we cannot succeed with the lim-
ited changes we are attempting right now, we need to work on chang-
ing the public perception and doing other things. Thus, with respect to
the question about simply giving up on trying to make standing work
and just focusing on eliminating the property status of animals, I do
not agree with the theory that if we are not succeeding with what we
are doing now, the solution is to attempt something more radical, be-
cause we are unlikely to prevail on such endeavors.
Question: Would you comment on the whole concept ofguardian-
ship ad litem, where it is not your human standing at issue, but the
animal's standing? .
Tischler: In 1980, I filed a lawsuit against a veterinarian who
allegedly committed malpractice on a standard poodle. 116 The first
listed plaintiff was the poodle, whose name was Sterling Berg.117 I
moved for an order appointing Sterling's owner to serve as his guard-
ian ad litem.l18 I was lucky I did not get involuntarily committed. It is
something that I would think long and hard about before attempting
again. The timing, the judge, and the facts would have to be just right.
Question: What about the substitution of a chimpanzee, instead
of a dog or cat?
Tischler: I understand where you are heading, but my experience
has been that when I speak to a general audience about dogs and cats,
people seem to understand and embrace my points more readily than
when I talk about chimpanzees. That is because dogs and cats are
members of our families, and more people relate to them as emotional
beings. Most people are emotionally more distant from chimpanzees,
because they are not raised with chimpanzees. We may see chimpan-
zees on a National Geographic television special, but most people, in-
cluding judges, have never actually met or spent time with them. For
. .
that reason, chimpanzees do not necessarily make a more compelling
plaintiff.
Meyer: It is a great idea though. The problem is you have to do it
at the right time with the right judge. We spend a lot of time figuring
116 Berg v. Gunn, No. 258590, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo Cty. Oct. 27,
1981).
117 [d. at 1.
118 [d. at 1.
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out which case to bring, where to bring it, and how to allege standing.
What we are worried about is going backwards. With every case we
bring, we run the risk that not only might we lose that case, but the
judge might issue a decision that takes the entire movement two steps
backwards. People in this room have been thinking about this a lot. It
is a question of when, under what circumstances, and exactly how to
get there.
Lovvorn: We not only have to think about steps backwards, but
also steps forward. The theory that drives people to say "it should be a
chimpanzee rather than a bull" is the same tactical, strategic thinking
that makes us think long and hard about the net result of our actions.
No matter what we convince a lower federal court of, anywhere in
America, whatever novel theory, we have the United States Supreme
Court as currently constituted waiting for us. Even if we got every-
thing in our wildest dreams in a federal court case, the last place we
would stop is the United States Supreme Court. We need to think
about who is there waiting for us.
Meyer: The state of the judiciary is so important. That is the an-
swer to all of these questions. Unfortunately, it never becomes a politi-
cal issue. The only issue the public talks about is abortion, when we
are discussing who should be on the Supreme Court. There are many
other federal courts that are making laws out there. We never talk
about these other very important issues, that these judges-young
judges, appointed for life-are deciding as the laws of this country.
They are making these decisions. As Jonathan [Lovvorn] says, you can
win the greatest case as guardian ad litem on behalf of a chimpanzee,
but then you are eventually going to have to deal with judges like Jus-
tices Scalia and Roberts, and it can become a lost cause. Obviously,
animal rights might not be the best issue to discuss for the judiciary
~ebate, but environmental laws might be. In recent debates, we did not
hear much discussion like, "Well, if Judge Alito is appointed to the Su-
preme Court, what is he going to do to the environment? If it's Judge
Roberts, what about that decision under the Endangered Species
Act?"119 Much of the debate was about abortion.120 That myopic focus
is a crime, frankly. People need to focus on other issues, and we need to
focus on judicial selection as part of the presidential election: Who is
this person going to put on the courts? Who is going to be making the
laws that will govern our lives? Those are very important issues.
119 See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts,
J. dissenting) (stating that the "panel's approach in this case leads to the result that
regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in
California constitutes regulating 'Commerce ... among the several States'").
120 See generally Robin Toner, Court in Transition: Abortion, NY.Times A22 (July
21, 2005) ("Cold paper trail leads some to scrutinize nominee's past words on abor-
tion."); Nancy Benac, Abortion Focus of Nominations, Again, Centre Daily Times A3
(Nov. 13, 2005) (stating "Abortion was the first question out of the box at the Supreme
Court confirmation hearing").
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Question: When we talk about the private right of enforcement,
the argument has been bandied about that instead of putting the onus
with law enforcement or the government and saying that we must hold
them accountable to pursue these cases, we are saying, "Clearly you're
not going to do it, so we're going to have to do it." I want to know your
perspective oil that argument.
Meyer: The only way to hold government officials accountable is
to vote out the President who appointed them. There is no way to hold
them accountable-in the federal context, there is no way-there is
nothing I can do about the fact that the USDA does not enforce the
AWA, other than go out and vote for somebody next time for President
who is going to put different people in charge of that agency. Citizens
cannot bring a lawsuit against the USDA for not enforcing a stat-
ute. 121 The Supreme Court has made that clear in Heckler v. Cha-
ney .122 I do not think a lot of people understand that we cannot bring a
lawsuit against a federal agency for failing to enforce the statute it is
obligated to enforce. 123 There is no way to hold these agencies account-
able, other than to complain loudly and write editorials. Our clients
have written reports about how the USDA is not enforcing the AWA124
There is nothing you can do about it. That is why. having a private
right of action is so important.
Of course that is not the reason we give when we are lobbying or
advocating for a private right of action. We say that we should take
these government officials at their word that they are overworked,
that they do not have enough resources. We say that we want to help
them by having private Attorneys General appointed to bring these
lawsuits, to supplement the agencies' enforcement authority. It is not
that the agencies are completely sympathetic to the industries they are
regulating-which is often really what is going on-it is that they are
overworked and need help. We are volunteering to help them.
Lovvorn: There is also something very practical lurking in your
question. Look at the Woodley case that the Animal Legal Defense
Fund brought in North Carolina under that state's private enforce-
ment statute.125 It was one of the biggest successes that the movement
has seen in the last decade. What you do not see, however, is twenty-
five similar actions being filed, because no animal protection organiza-
tion has the resources necessary to take on those animals .. It is very
expensive to care for and house hundreds of animals for years while a
case winds its way through the courts, not to mention that animal
121 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Am. Socy. Prevention Cruelty Animals, Fund Animals & Animal Welfare
Inst., Government Sanctioned Abuse: How the United States Department ofAgriculture
Allows Ringling Brothers Circus to Systematically Mistreat Elephants, http://www
.animalwelfllre.com/wildlife/elephants/fullrpt.pdf (Sept. 2003).
125 ALDF v. Woodley, No. 04 CVD 1248, slip op. at 7~ (N.C. Super. 11th Dist. Apr.
12, 2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 19A (2003).
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groups do not enjoy any immunity from civil suits the way public pros-
ecutors do. Thus, the point about making sure that prosecutors and
others actually do their government appointed jobs is very important.
We cannot just privatize enforcement and hope that it is going to get
done. It would certainly help to have those private rights of actions, if
they were politically feasible, but they are not a silver bullet. The peo-
ple who are charged with doing these enforcement jobs need to do
. them, because no one else can.
Cassuto: I offer a flip side to that. With respect to whether or not
it is crying uncle, I would cry uncle, I would cry aunt, I would sing
Waltzing Matilda if it would just get some of these laws strengthened
and enforced. I do not really care who is doing it. I want there to be a
reasonable and expected method of enforcement, such that it would
create a deterrent and make it less likely that these abuses would oc-
cur. I am cautiously optimistic that ifthere were more private rights of
action, there would also be more state enforcement. There would be
both the shame phenomenon-states would not want private citizens
always doing the work of the government-and there would also be an
understanding that this is an important issue to the voters and tax-
payers of this state or nation. That combined set of pressures stem-
ming from the private right of action would, one hopes, create an
enforcement priority within the state.
Tischler: I would like to thank this group of lively, passionate,
and experienced lawyers for sharing their insights.
Kandhari: Thank you Jonathan Lovvorn, Katherine Meyer,
David Cassuto, and Joyce Tischler.
